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An integrated science of language is usually advocated as a step forward for linguistic
research. In this paper, we maintain that integration of this sort is premature, and
cannot take place before we identify a common object of study. We advocate instead a
science of language that is inherently multi-faceted, and takes into account the different
viewpoints as well as the different definitions of the object of study. We also advocate
the use of different data sources, which, if non-contradictory, can provide more solid
evidence for linguistic analysis. Last, we argue that generative grammar is an important
tile in the puzzle.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, Christiansen and Chater (2017) (henceforth CC) argue in favor of an ‘integrated
science of language.’ Just as “integration and interaction between levels of analysis and diverse
data is ubiquitous [in] the physical and biological sciences,” progress in linguistics can only be
guaranteed by taking into account a wide variety of data from a range of different sources.
We suspect there are not many linguists who would disagree with the observation that attempts
to integrate knowledge and to facilitate interaction between students of language working at
different ‘levels of analysis’ would probably be beneficial to the field. Clearly, the number and
variety of empirical sources that have become available in recent decades for anyone interested in
the topic of human language has broadened considerably, and continues to do so: from ultrasound
measurements to automatic exploration of large amounts of words used on social media, and from
fieldwork notes on Amazonian languages that are already extinct to neurolinguistics data on people
learning artificial languages while in an MRI machine – all of these can potentially shed light on
the question what human language is and how it works. It is regrettable indeed that the boundaries
between the people studying all these different types of data are seldom crossed.
CC, however, see one major obstacle in this integration: ‘Chomskyan’ linguistics. They state:
“Many of the phenomena that have become the focus of syntactic theory are so abstract that they
are often difficult to connect even with specific linguistic phenomena, let alone with experiments on
how people process language or observations of how children learn their native tongue.” For this
reason, they propose replacing generative grammar with construction grammars (for which they
cite Goldberg, 2006; strangely, they do not cite any reference for generative grammar), because
their “quasi-regular nature [. . .] allows them to capture both the rule-like patterns as well as the
myriad of exceptions that often are excluded by fiat from the old view built on abstract rules.”
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They do not give precise details about how construction grammar
makes better predictions than generative grammar.
The structure of CC’s argument is very similar to that
put forward by Levinson and Evans (2010) (henceforth LE),
although CC do not mention that earlier paper. LE state that
“[generativists] draw on a very small subset of the data –
especially, intuitions about complex clauses. Meanwhile, the
available data types (corpora, typological databases, multimedia
records), and the range of data over the languages of the world,
has vastly increased in recent years, as has the scientific treatment
of grammatical intuitions” and they contrast this with “the vastly
increased quantity, quality and types of data now available to
the descriptive and comparative linguist.” Like CC, LE seem to
argue for an integrated science of language, in which everybody
is welcome to contribute, except for the Chomskyans.
We believe that CC and LE misrepresent the range of
methodologies that are used by scholars sympathetic to the
generative paradigm, in which many kinds of data have also been
studied recently, and sometimes with considerable success. We
agree with them that the question of how the body of ideas that
constitutes generative grammar should relate to the wealth of data
that is available to us is important, as is whether there is any
place for generative inquiry/biolinguistics (Jenkins, 2000) in an
integrated science of language. We want to discuss both of these
questions in this short contribution.
THE ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE IN
GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
Anybody who seriously aims to undertake an integrated study
of language should first note that there is very little agreement
about the ontology of the object of study among linguists. One
clear opposition is that which could be referred to as Chomsky
vs. Saussure. In the first line of thought, language is seen as
a cognitive object, something which resides in the mind of an
individual speaker (Chomsky, 1957, 1965 ff.), and communities
present chaotic mixtures of these idiolects. The other line is the
Saussurean view (also foundational to, e.g., Labovian linguistics)
in which language resides in a community, and the language
production of individual speakers is an imperfect reflection of
those speakers. Both of these positions seem coherent in their
own right, and work from both schools can be combined,
although they obviously conflict in their ultimate vision of what
language is. There are also other visions available, such as the
Platonic view (Postal, 2009) which sees language as “a purely
abstract object, on a par with those of mathematics.”
It is important to point out that such approaches are not
easily reconciled, as they seem incommensurable in the well-
known sense of Kuhn (1962): they are different in scope. This
does not mean that data or even insights cannot be transferred
from one to the other; witness successful work that has been done
over the years that shows otherwise (see for instance Kroch’s,
1994; Cornips and Corrigan’s, 2005; and Adger’s, 2016 work
on “socio-syntax,” to use Adger’s term). Such interactions are,
however, more complicated than different ‘levels of analysis’ (say,
the subatomic level to the atomic level) in physics; the linguistic
disciplines are simply not easily integrated in any reasonable
sense of that word.
It is not clear where CC and LE stand in this debate
about the ontology of language. On the one hand, there is a
certain sympathy in both papers for so-called cognitive grammar
(of which construction grammar is usually seen as a variant,
i.e., Cognitive Construction Grammar, inspired by Goldberg,
1995 ff.), although both papers occasionally refer to ‘culture’
and ‘communication’ as sources of explanation, leaving open the
question of how these different modalities relate to each other
(whether they are to be seen as ‘different levels of analysis’). At
first sight, the first victim of a revolutionary ‘integration’ along
the lines of LE and CC seems to be the Saussurian/Labovian view
of language rather than the Chomskyan view. In any case, there
seems to be no attempt to reconcile these different views with one
another, or with the Platonic view (but see Watumull, 2013 on the
potential compatibility of Platonism and biolinguistics).
CC make use of a very salient metaphor: language is like
a crossword, where figuring out one clue will help figure out
the next clue. They describe the way that language acquisition
takes place in a crossword-like fashion. Children are sensitive
to “multiple sources of probabilistic information available in the
linguistic input: from the sound of words to their co-occurrence
patterns to information from semantic and pragmatic contexts.”
According to CC, there is no need to postulate an innate set of
pre-existing categories, for instance: children can infer categories
from statistical analyses of distribution. The construction
grammar approach accounts very well, CC maintain, for the
diversity of the world’s languages.
The first observation that comes to mind is that this view of
generative grammar is inaccurate: many generative approaches
do not postulate pre-existing categories (see the work of
Wiltschko or Biberauer on emergentist features). Then, it seems
to us that construction grammar lacks predictive power: much
like the old transformational grammar rules, in construction
grammar everything goes, as long as there is evidence for it.
No restriction is imposed on structures because of the system
itself. We know that this is not accurate. Although many of
the macro-parametric approaches have proved unsuccessful,
some generalizations on co-occurring structural properties across
languages cannot be easily denied.
Keeping the empirical coverage aside for the moment, we
submit that, using CC’s metaphor, integration is impossible,
because the clues are not for the same crossword. It is possible
that convincing theories will be developed in which a link can
be found between the psychological and the sociological, and
between each of these and the abstract, in which case we could
hope to build a truly integrative framework for the language
sciences. None of this means that one particular view (of those
mentioned) on this issue on this is inherently superior. As
Chomsky (2001:34) phrased it:
Internalist biolinguistic inquiry [Chomsky’s term for
what we call Chomskyan linguistics here] does not, of
course, question the legitimacy of other approaches to
language, any more than internalist inquiry into bee
communication invalidates the study of how the relevant
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internal organization of bees enters into their social
structure. The investigations do not conflict; they are
mutually supportive. In the case of humans, though not
other organisms, the issues are subject to controversy, often
impassioned, and needless.
It should be added that Chomsky’s practice or that of his
followers may not always have conformed to this dictum, and
have sometimes suggested that the only way of doing linguistics
is by doing generative grammar, or that ‘language’ is a synonym
for ‘the innate capacity to acquire language.’
We propose, then, that rather than attempting a premature
integration of different branches of linguistics, we should
maximally profit from the mosaical nature of the field: the many
different viewpoints that are taken on subject matters that have
many things in common. Integration, as proposed in CC and
LE, would lead to severe impoverishment of those points of
view, forcing all linguistics to work in one frame (construction
grammar) that was never designed to answer all questions and
that has not had the time to be sufficiently tested. To borrow
another set of terms from Kuhn, it is as if CC and LE want to
move immediately from a period of (perceived) crisis to normal
science, without wanting to go through the stage of paradigm
shift. We think linguistics is not yet ready to be a coherent
normal science, and it would be detrimental to pretend that it is:
one can obviously always carry out numerous ‘empirical studies’,
but without a solid base it is impossible to achieve the kind of
cumulative effect that is so typical of ‘real science.’
Generative grammar, or more precisely a form of
biolinguistics, based on a view in which language is primarily
an internal tool for thought or expression of thought, cannot be
excluded from such a multifaceted way of studying language.
One can argue, if one sees reasons to do so, that current work on
this matter is not satisfactory or is even wrong, but one cannot a
priori deny that there are reasons to engage in such an enterprise.
A mosaical view on linguistics, we find, is a better metaphor
than a crossword: we have tiles of different shapes, different
colors, and differing importance. Inserting one tile in the mosaic
will only give us a clue about what comes next, what is adjacent.
Only the combination of all tiles allows us to see the full picture.
If some tiles are missing, we will be able to figure them out. But,
importantly, tiles do not resemble crossword clues, as they are
not uniform in nature. Insights from different disciplines can
all contribute tiles. The combination of all these tiles, including
those regarding structural dependencies coming from generative
grammar, will give us a picture of language.
THE DATA FOR GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
This, then, seems to us the most reasonable position for
generative grammar among the language sciences: as an approach
to understanding what is specific about human language (in
particular syntax) and to specifying what computational capacity
the human mind needs to be able to acquire and use syntax.
In no way should this prevent generative grammarians from
collaborating with scholars working on other aspects, sometimes
even within a completely different paradigm. We have already
mentioned above work on the crossroads with sociolinguistics
above, but we should also consider work such as that by
Andrea Moro on neurolinguistics, by George Walkden and David
Lightfoot on diachronic linguistics, and by William Snyder, Maria
Teresa Guasti, and Jason Rothman on psycholinguistics and
acquisition.
It follows from this list that CC and LE’s view of the range
of types of data on which generative work is based is too
pessimistic. There is also no reason why it could not widen more.
For instance, the fact that intuitions often lack a quantitative
component does not make them inherently less valuable, as Labov
(1987), one of the fathers of quantitative linguistics, reminds us:
But the qualitative is not easily displaced. Many forms of
linguistic behavior are categorically invariant. Furthermore,
the number, variety and complexity of linguistic relations
are very great, and it is not likely that a large proportion
can be investigated by quantitative means. At present, we
do not know the correct balance between the two modes of
analysis.
On the contrary, any kind of scientific enterprise can only
benefit from including as much empirical evidence as possible. As
the eventual goal of generative grammar is to discover properties
of the human mind, there is no such thing as direct evidence for
this; there is no golden path. Intuitions have the advantage of
being cheap and easy to acquire, but since they have their own
inherent problems (they are not always as clear as we would want
them to be; there can easily be interference with external norms
on language, etc.), it seems that extending the empirical basis can
only be a good thing.
For this we could follow, for instance, the taxonomy offered
in van Oostendorp (2013), which was made for phonology, but
can be easily extended to syntax: this taxonomy recognizes four
types of evidence: traditional evidence (such as judgments, or
the Wug tests); experimental evidence (such as that acquired in
psycholinguistic of neurolinguistics laboratories); evidence from
large databases and corpora (whether found in historical archives
or tagged collections of modern text); and formal evidence (the
results of computer modeling, analysis of formal elegance, etc.).
All of these general types of data can be helpful beyond what
we can establish from judgments alone. For instance, artificial
language learning experiments (Moro, 2016) have shown that
‘crazy patterns,’ predicted not to exist by current theories, involve
a different part of the brain than ‘realistic patterns.’ Automatic
searching of large corpora can lead us to find patterns that an
analyst would never have thought of independently. Computer
modeling helps to make theories maximally explicit and thereby
exposes hidden flaws.
None of these data can give us direct access to what we are
really interested in – an object of considerable abstractness. We
can therefore only aim to find convergent evidence from many
different sides. The work on these types of data can of course
take place in cooperation with researchers with a slightly different
focus, which can in fact improve the way we approach the object
of study. It does not necessarily mean that one has to share the
same view on what should be studied.
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Finally, it should also be kept in mind that even people
who consider themselves practitioners of Chomskyan generative
syntax do not necessarily have the same interests. We feel
that there is a rather wide consensus that there are at least
two types: those working in some version of what used to be
called Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981), taking
an interest mostly in trying to explain patterns in individual
language varieties; and those subscribing whole-heartedly to the
Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995). The former will typically
be closer to types of data such as those just listed, whereas for
the latter, the analyses formed by G&B count as data of some
kind. This is the kind of work that presumably led CC to their
complaint that the analyses are “so abstract that they are often
difficult to connect even with specific linguistic phenomena.” We
hope to have shown by now that this vision is too narrow, as it
presupposes that there is some non-theoretical way of deciding
what “specific linguistic phenomena” are. However, all ‘linguistic
phenomena’ are theory-laden and dependent on one’s ontology of
language. Suggesting otherwise, and operating on the assumption
that we have some pre-theoretical conception of the subject
matter is, in our view, not going to lead linguistics very far.
CONCLUSION
As sympathetic as it may sound at first sight, calls for ‘integration’
of the language sciences, such as those by CC and LE, do
not take into account the fact that there is no consensus on
what linguistics is about, or what the explananda are – and
therefore what the data to be taken into account are. Rather
than calling for an integration of this type, which in our view
can only lead to multiple small case studies, and experiments
without sufficient loopback to a strong theory, we think it
is better to opt for a model of the language sciences as a
mosaic of different views and methodologies, hoping that in
this way – and by cooperating across the disciplines rather than
dismissing some of them out of hand – we can achieve a better
understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon that is human
language.
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